121.10-2 App II

Mathematics - Course 121

SOLUTIONS TO ASSIGNMENTS

This Appendix contains 'skeleton' solutions to computational Assignment questions in the text.

121.00-3 Probability Problems - Solutions

- 1. Let M,W denote "man survives", "wife survives", respectively.
 - (a) $P(M \cap W) = P(M) P(W)$ (PR1) = .8 x .9 = .72
 - (b) $P(M \cap \overline{W}) = .8 \times .1$ (PR1) = .08
 - (c) $P(\overline{M} \cap W) = .2 \times .9$ (PR1) = .18
 - (d) P(MUW) = P(M) + P(W) P(M)P(W) (PR3) = .8 + .9 - .8 x .9 = 0.98
- 2. (a) Combinations yielding a total of 7 are (1,6), (6,1) (2,5), (5,2), (3,4), (4,3) \therefore using geometrical definition of probability, P(sum of 7) = $\frac{6}{36}$ $= \frac{1}{6}$ (b) There are 11 outcomes involving a "1" \therefore P(no 1) = $\frac{25}{36}$

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(c) Number of outcomes involving exactly one 1 = 10

... P(one 1) =
$$\frac{10}{36}$$

= $\frac{5}{18}$

(d) P(at least one 1) =
$$\frac{11}{36}$$

3. Let 3W denote "3 white balls", etc

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(a) No. ways to get 3 of the 5 white balls = ${}_{5}^{C}{}_{3}$ No. ways to get 0 of the 3 black balls = ${}_{3}^{C}{}_{0}$ No. ways to choose 3 balls from the 8 balls = ${}_{8}^{C}{}_{3}$

• P(3W) =
$$\frac{5^{C_3} \times 3^{C_0}}{8^{C_3}}$$

= $(\frac{5!}{3!2!} \times \frac{3!}{3!0!}) \div \frac{8!}{5!3!}$
= $\frac{5}{28}$

(b)
$$P(3WU3B) = P(3W) + P(3B)$$
 (PR4)
 $P(3B) = \frac{5^{C_0} \times 3^{C_3}}{8^{C_3}}$
 $= \frac{1}{56}$
 $\cdot \cdot P(3WU3B) = \frac{5}{28} + \frac{1}{56}$
 $= \frac{11}{56}$

(c) P(at least one white) = 1 - P(OW (PR5) = 1 - P(3B) (OW<->3B) = 1 = $\frac{1}{56}$ (from (b)) = $\frac{55}{56}$

There are 10 possible last digits for the second number, 4. 9 of which will differ from the last digit of the first number. ... P(different last digits) = $\frac{9}{10}$ 5. Let Gl = "first child girl", etc P(G2|G1) = P(G2) since G1, G2 (a) independent $=\frac{1}{2}$ (b) $P(2 \text{ girls}|\text{at least one girl}) = \frac{P(2 \text{ girls} \cap \text{at least one girl})}{P(\text{at least one girl})}$ $= \frac{P(2 \text{ girls})}{1-P(2 \text{ boys})}$ $= \frac{\frac{1}{4}}{1 - \frac{1}{4}}$ = $\frac{1}{3}$ (a) $P(6 \cap H \cap KS) = P(6) P(H) P(KS)$ 6. (PR1) $=\frac{1}{6} \times \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{52}$ $=\frac{1}{624}$ (b) $P(\overline{60H0KS}) = 1 - \frac{1}{624}$ (PR5) $= \frac{623}{624}$ $P(odd \cap T \cap Club) = P(odd) P(T) P(Club)$ (c) (PR1) $=\frac{3}{6} \times \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{13}{52}$ $= \frac{1}{16}$

(d)
$$P[(6UE)\cap Q] = P(6UE)P(Q)$$
 (PE1)
 $= [P(6) + P(H) - P(6)P(E)]P(Q)$ (PR3)
 $= (\frac{1}{6} + \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{6} \times \frac{1}{2})\frac{4}{52}$
 $= \frac{7}{156}$
7. $P(3R\cap 2B\cap 0W) = \frac{7^{C_3} \times 4^{C_2} \times 3^{C_0}}{14^{C_5}}$
 $= \frac{15}{143}$
8. (a) Outcomes in E_1 are (1,4), (4,1), (2,3), (3,2)
 $\therefore P(E_1) = \frac{4}{36}$
 $= \frac{1}{9}$
(b) $P(E_2) = P(R4UG4)$ (R4 \equiv red 4, etc)
 $= P(R4) + P(G4) - P(R4)P(G4)$
 $= \frac{1}{6} + \frac{1}{6} - \frac{1}{6} \times \frac{1}{6}$
 $= \frac{11}{35}$
(c) $P(E_3) = 0$ (impossible event)
(d) $P(R4\cap G5) = P(R4)P(G5)$ (PR1)
 $= \frac{1}{6} \times \frac{1}{6}$
 $= \frac{1}{36}$

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(e)
$$P(R4 \cup G5) = P(R4) + P(G5) - P(R4) P(G5)$$
 (PR3)
$$= \frac{1}{6} + \frac{1}{6} - \frac{1}{6} \times \frac{1}{6}$$
$$= \frac{11}{36}$$

9. (a) P(At least one person gets all the cards of one suit) $= \frac{4^2 \times 13^C 13 \times 39^C 13 \times 26^C 13 \times 13^C 13}{52^C 13 \times 39^C 13 \times 26^C 13 \times 13^C 13}$ $= 2.52 \times 10^{-11}$

(b) P(one person gets 4 aces, 4 kings, 4 queens)

$$= \frac{4 \times 12^{C_{12}} \times 40^{C_{1}} \times 39^{C_{13}} \times 26^{C_{13}} \times 13^{C_{13}}}{52^{C_{13}} \times 39^{C_{13}} \times 26^{C_{13}} \times 13^{C_{13}}}$$
$$= 2.52 \times 10^{-10}$$

10. Let E, A represent failure of engine, airframe, respectively. Then

P(failure) = P(EUA)

$$= P(E) + P(A) - P(E)P(A)$$

= 0.002 + 0.0007 - 0.002 x 0.0007
= 0.003

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11. P(2 heads at least 1H) = $\frac{P(2 \text{ heads } n \text{ at least 1H})}{P(\text{at least 1H})}$

$$= \frac{P(2 \text{ heads})}{1 - P(2 \text{ tails})}$$
$$= \frac{\frac{1}{4}}{1 - \frac{1}{4}}$$
$$= \frac{1}{\frac{3}{2}}$$

12. Let A, B, C, S represent failure of component A, B, C, and system, respectively. Then

$$P(S) = P(AU(BAC))$$

= P(A) + P(BAC) - P(A)P(BAC) (PR3)
= P(A) + P(B)P(C) - P(A)P(B)P(C) (PR1)
= 0.02 + 0.08 x 0.10 - 0.02 x 0.08 x 0.10
= 0.03

- 13. (a) N(A) = 31
 - (b) N(B) = 39
 - (c) N(C) = 30
 - (d) N(AnB) = 16
 - (e) $N(A\cap C) = 12$
 - (f) $N(A \cap B \cap C) = 4$
 - (g) N(AUB) = 54
 - (h) N(BUC) = 57
 - (i) N(AUBUC) = 64
 - (j) N(B(AUC)) = 24

14. (a)
$$P(B) = \frac{39}{75}$$

(b) $P(A) = \frac{31}{75}$
(c) $P(BA\overline{C}) = \frac{9}{25}$
(d) $P(\overline{B}AAC) = \frac{8}{75}$
(e) $P(B|A) = \frac{P(BAA)}{P(A)}$
 $= \frac{16}{31}$
(f) $P(C|B) = \frac{P(BAC)}{P(B)}$
 $= \frac{12}{39}$
 $= \frac{4}{13}$
(g) $P(AUC|B) = \frac{P([AUC]AB)}{P(B)}$
 $= \frac{24}{39}$
 $= \frac{8}{13}$
(h) $P(BAC|\overline{A}) = \frac{P((BAC)A\overline{A})}{P(\overline{A})}$
 $= \frac{8}{75} - 31$
 $= \frac{2}{11}$

(i)
$$P(\overline{B}|AAC) = \frac{P(\overline{B}AAC)}{P(AAC)}$$

= $\frac{8}{12}$
= $\frac{2}{3}$

15. Let A, B, C represent solution by A, B, C, respectively. Then P (solution) = P(AUBUC)

$$= 1 - P(\overline{A}\overline{A}\overline{B}\overline{A}\overline{C})$$
(PR5)

$$= 1 - P(\overline{A}) P(\overline{B}) P(\overline{C})$$
(PR1)
$$= 1 - \frac{3}{4} \times \frac{2}{3} \times \frac{1}{2}$$

$$= \frac{3}{4}$$

16. One Die

$$E(x) = \sum_{i} x_{i}P_{i}$$
 (x represents gain) (PR9)
 $= \$1(\frac{1}{6}) + 2\$(\frac{1}{6}) + 3\$(\frac{1}{6}) + (-\$4)\frac{1}{6} + 5(\frac{1}{6}) + (-\$6)\frac{1}{6}$
 $= \frac{\$\frac{1}{6}}{\frac{1}{6}}$
Two Dice
 $E(x) = \$2(\frac{1}{26}) + (\$3)\frac{2}{26} + (-\$4)\frac{3}{26} + (\$5)\frac{4}{26} + (-\$6)\frac{5}{26} + (\$7)\frac{6}{26}$

$$(\mathbf{x}) = \$2(\frac{1}{36}) + (\$3)\frac{1}{36} + (-\$4)\frac{1}{36} + (\$5)\frac{1}{36} + (-\$6)\frac{1}{36} + (\$7)\frac{1}{36}$$

$$+ (-\$8)\frac{5}{36} + (-\$9)\frac{4}{36} + (-\$10)\frac{3}{36} + (\$11)\frac{2}{36} + (-\$12)\frac{1}{36}$$

$$= -\$\frac{68}{36} \quad (-\$1.89)$$

.*. Student should play game with one die, but not with two dice.

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- 17. P(at least one number > 4) = 1 - P(both numbers ≤ 4) (PR5) = 1 - $(\frac{4}{6})^2$ = $\frac{5}{\frac{9}{2}}$
- 18. Let A, B denote "target hit by A, B", respectively. Then

(a)
$$P(AAB) = P(A)P(B)$$
 (PR1)

$$= \frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{4})$$

$$= \frac{1}{8}$$
(b) $P(AA\overline{B}) = \frac{1}{2}(\frac{3}{4})$

$$= \frac{3}{8}$$
(c) $P(\overline{A}AB) = \frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{4})$

$$= \frac{1}{8}$$
(d) $P(\overline{A}A\overline{B}) = P(\overline{A})P(\overline{B})$

$$= \frac{1}{2}(\frac{3}{4})$$

$$= \frac{3}{8}$$

(e) Suppose B must fire n times.
Then P(target missed altogether)
$$\leq 0.1$$

 $\Rightarrow P(\overline{A} \cap \overline{B}_1 \cap \overline{B}_2 \cap \dots \cap \overline{B}_n) \leq 0.1$
ie, $P(\overline{A}) [P(B)]^n \leq 0.1$ (PR1)
ie, $\frac{1}{2} (\frac{3}{4})^n \leq 0.1$
ie, n log 0.75 \leq log 0.2
ie, n $\geq \frac{\log 0.2}{\log 0.75}$
ie, n ≥ 5.6
ie, B must fire 6 times before probability that target
is hit exceeds 90%.

= Number odd-odd combinations Number odd-odd + Number even-even

$$= \frac{5^2}{5^2 + 4^2}$$
$$= \frac{25}{5^2}$$

20. $E(x) = \sum_{i} x_{i}P_{i}$ (x represents gain) = (\$1) P(1 head) + (\$2)P(2 heads) + (-\$5)P(2 tails) = (\$1) ($\frac{1}{2}$) + (\$2) $\frac{1}{4}$ + (-\$5) ($\frac{1}{4}$) = $\frac{-$\frac{1}{4}}{-$\frac{1}{4}}$

. . he should not be playing the game.

21. Let A, B represent item manufactured by machine #1, 2, respectively, and D represent item defective. Then

$$P(D) = P(D|A)P(A) + P(D|B)P(B)$$
(PR8)
= 0.05 x 0.70 + 0.08 x 0.30
= 0.059

22. (a)
$$P(AAB) = P(A|B)P(B)$$
 (PR7)

$$= \frac{6}{11}(\frac{11}{36})$$

$$= \frac{1}{6}$$
(b) $P(AUB) = P(A) + P(B) - P(AAB)$

$$= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{11}{36} - \frac{1}{6}$$

$$= \frac{23}{36}$$
(c) $P(AAB) = P(A) - P(AAB)$

$$= \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{6}$$

$$= \frac{1}{3}$$
(d) $P(BAB) = P(B) - P(BA)$

$$= \frac{11}{36} - \frac{1}{6}$$

$$= \frac{5}{36}$$

121	.00-	-5	Safety Systems Analysis - Solutions to Sample Problems
1.	Q	=	$\lambda \frac{T}{2}$
		=	$\frac{5}{12 \times 30} \times \frac{1}{2}$
r		=	3×10^{-3}
2.	Q	=	$\lambda \frac{\mathbf{T}}{2}$
		=	$\frac{3}{6 \times 12} \times \frac{\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{52}}{2}$
		-	2×10^{-4}
3.	Q _s	-	$Q_1 + Q_2 - Q_1 Q_2$
		=	1.7×10^{-2}
4.	Q _s	=	Q _p ²
		=	4×10^{-4}
5.	Q	=	$\lambda \frac{T}{2}$
		=	$\frac{50}{15 \times 10} \times \frac{\frac{1}{52}}{2}$
		=	3×10^{-3}
6.	т	=	$\frac{2Q}{\lambda}$
		=	$\frac{2 \times 1.0 \times 10^{-2}}{\frac{15}{5 \times 12}}$
		=	0.08 years or 4.2 weeks.

ie, the system should be tested every 4 weeks.

7.
$$Q = \lambda \frac{T}{2}$$

 $= \frac{10}{12 \times 8} \times \frac{12}{2}$
 $= \frac{4 \times 10^{-3}}{2}$
8. $AR = \lambda_R \lambda_P \frac{T_P}{2}$
 $= \frac{3}{9} \times \frac{50}{9} \times \frac{\frac{1}{3} \times \frac{1}{365}}{2}$
 $= \frac{8 \times 10^{-4}}{2}$

9. (a) AR =
$$\lambda_R (Q_p + Q_{CT} - 2Q_P Q_{CT})$$
 (exclusive "or")
= 0.3(2 x 10⁻³ + 5 x 10⁻³ - 2 x 2 x 10⁻³ x 5 x 10⁻³)
= 2×10^{-3}

(b) AR =
$$\lambda_R Q_P Q_{CT}$$

= 0.3 x 2 x 10⁻³ x 5 x 10⁻³
= 3 x 10⁻⁶

10. (a)
$$Q = \lambda \frac{T}{2}$$

= $\frac{8}{6 \times 15} \times \frac{1}{2}$
= $\frac{4 \times 10^{-3}}{1000}$

(b) Test daily.

(c)
$$T = \frac{2Q}{\lambda}$$

= $\frac{2 \times 10^{-2}}{\frac{8}{6 \times 15}}$
= 0.225y or 12 weeks

11.
$$Q_{S} = P(\vec{A}U[\vec{B}CDU\vec{B}CDU\vec{B}CDU\vec{B}CD})$$

$$= Q_{A} + [3Q_{B}^{2}R_{B} + Q_{B}^{3}] - Q_{A} []$$

$$= 0.05 + [3(.1)^{2}(.9) + (.1)^{3}] - 0.05 \times []$$

$$= 0.08$$

12. (a) Q = fraction of time pump unavailable

$$= \frac{124 \text{ h}}{5 \times 365 \times 24 \text{ h}}$$
$$= \underline{2.8 \times 10^{-3}}$$

(b) $Q_{S} = P[(exactly 2 pumps fail)U(exactly 3 pumps fail)]$ = $3C_{2}Q^{2}R + {}_{3}C_{3}Q^{3})$ = $3(.0028)^{2}(1-.0028) + (.0028)^{3}$ = 2.4×10^{-5}

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13. (a)
$$P_{LS} = \lambda \frac{T}{2} = .02 \times \frac{1}{12} = \frac{.02}{24} = \frac{.01}{12}$$

 $P_{PS} = \lambda \frac{T}{2} = .02 \times \frac{1}{12} = \frac{.01}{12}$
 $P_{PV} = \lambda \frac{T}{2} = .05 \times \frac{1}{12} = \frac{.05}{24}$
 $Q_{S} = (\frac{.01}{12})^{2} + (\frac{.01}{12}) + 5(\frac{.05}{24})$
 $= 0.01$
(b) $P_{LS} \longrightarrow .04 \times \frac{1}{12} = \frac{.01}{6}$
 $\therefore Q_{S} = (\frac{.01}{6})^{2} + (\frac{.01}{12}) + 5(\frac{.05}{24})$
 $= 0.01$ (ie, virtually no change since LS contributes negligibly to Q_{S} in both cases.)

14. Fraction of time system unavailable,

$$Q = \lambda \frac{T}{2} = \frac{20}{4} \times \frac{\frac{1}{365}}{2} = 0.007 < 1\%$$

- . . probability of fault existing at any given instant < 18.
- Q α T and T = 1 week is seven times greater than T = 1 • • day,

since LS

. . unavailability would be seven times greater with same λ and weekly testing.

15. (a) AR =
$$\lambda_R Q_P$$

= $\lambda_R \lambda_P \frac{T_P}{2}$
= $\frac{2}{6} \times \frac{3}{6} \times \frac{\frac{1}{365}}{2}$
= $\frac{2.3 \times 10^{-4}}{2}$
(b) Unavailability of containment,
 $Q_C = Q_1 + Q_2 - Q_1 Q_2$,
where $Q_1 \equiv$ unavailability of air locks

$$= \frac{40 \text{ hr}}{6 \times 365 \times 24 \text{ hr}}$$

= 7.6 x 10⁻⁴
and Q₂ = unavailability of logic system
$$= \lambda \frac{\text{T}}{2}$$

$$= \frac{4}{6} \times \frac{52}{2}$$

= 6.4 x 10⁻³
... Q₂ = unavailability of logic system
$$= \lambda \frac{\text{T}}{2}$$

$$= \frac{4}{6} \times \frac{52}{2}$$

$$= 6.4 \times 10^{-3}$$

... Q_C = 7.6 x 10⁻⁴ + 6.4 x 10⁻³ = 7.2 x 10⁻³

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... P(runaway + release) = AR x Q_C
= 2.3 x 10⁻⁴ x 7.2 x 10⁻³
=
$$1.7 \times 10^{-6}$$

16. (a) The reliability of safety systems can be increased by:

- (i) use of redundant components.
- (ii) preventive replacement of components prior to wearout.
- (iii) testing more frequently.
- 17. Reactor safety systems should be tested routinely.
 - (a) to detect and repair/replace faulty components.
 - (b) to maintain system reliability.

 $(R = 1 - Q = 1 - \lambda \frac{T}{2}$ the shorter T, the greater R)

- (c) to demonstrate whether or not reliability is meeting target, so that corrective action (eg, upgrading system, or more frequent testing) can be taken if it is not.
- (d) to satisfy AECB license requirements.
- 18. (a) Expected runaway frequency,

$$\lambda_{rw} = \lambda_R \lambda_P \frac{T_P}{2}$$
$$= \frac{3}{5} \times \frac{2}{5} \times \frac{\frac{1}{365}}{2}$$
$$= \underline{3 \times 10^{-4}}$$

(b) Probability of one or more LOR's/y,

$$Q(1) = 1 - R(1)$$

= 1 - e^{- λ R × 1}
= 1 - e^{-0.6}
= 0.45

19. Let Q, Q, Q represent unreliabilities of a value, a line, and the system, respectively.

(a) (i)
$$Q_V = \lambda \frac{T}{2}$$

= $\frac{6}{6 \times 5} \times \frac{\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{52}}{2}$
= 1.0 × 10⁻³ (9.6 × 10⁻⁴)

(ii) $Q_1 = \text{prob. either upper or lower value fails}$ = $Q_v + Q_v - Q_v^2$ = 2(9.6 x 10⁻⁴) = 2×10^{-3} (1.9 x 10⁻³)

(b)
$$Q_s = \text{prob. all three lines fail}$$

= $Q_k 3$
= $(1.9 \times 10^{-3})^3$
= $\frac{7 \times 10^{-9}}{2}$

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20. (a) Unreliability of a dump channel,

$$Q_{C} = \lambda \frac{T}{2}$$

$$= \frac{4}{5 \times 3} \times \frac{\frac{1}{3} \times \frac{1}{52}}{2}$$

$$= \underline{9 \times 10^{-4}} \qquad (8.55 \times 10^{-4})$$

(b) Q_{S} = prob. of 2 or 3 channels failing at once,

$$= {}_{3}{}^{C}{}_{2}{}^{Q}{}_{C}^{2}(1 - {}_{Q}{}_{C}) + {}_{3}{}^{C}{}_{3}{}^{Q}{}_{C}^{3}$$

= 3(8.5 x 10⁻⁴)²
= $\underline{2 \times 10^{-6}}$ (2.2 x 10⁻⁶)

Assuming F valves open:	Assuming F valves shut:
$Q_{S} = prob. both D, E fail$	Q _S = prob. either D or E fails or both
$= Q_C^2$	$= Q_{\rm C} + Q_{\rm C} - Q_{\rm C}^2$
$= (8.5 \times 10^{-4})^2$	$= 2(8.5 \times 10^{-4})$
$= \frac{7 \times 10^{-7}}{10^{-7}}$	$= 1.7 \times 10^{-3}$

21. Let Q_C, Q_V represent unreliability of control channel, mechanics of a valve, respectively.

(a) (i)
$$Q_{C} = \lambda \frac{T}{2}$$

 $= \frac{4}{5 \times 3} \frac{\frac{1}{3} \times \frac{1}{52}}{2}$
 $= \frac{8.5 \times 10^{-4}}{10^{-4}}$
(ii) $Q_{V} = \lambda \frac{T}{2}$
 $= \frac{7}{5 \times 6} \times \frac{\frac{1}{2} \times \frac{1}{52}}{2}$
 $= \frac{1.1 \times 10^{-3}}{10^{-3}}$

(b) (i) Suppose channel D failed. Then system effectively as shown:



 Q_{S} = prob. either E or F fails or either value fails mechanically.

$$= (2Q_{\rm C} - Q_{\rm C}^{2}) + (2Q_{\rm V} - Q_{\rm V}^{2}) - (2Q_{\rm C} - Q_{\rm C}^{2})(2Q_{\rm V} - Q_{\rm V}^{2})$$

$$= 2(Q_{\rm C} + Q_{\rm V})$$

$$= \frac{4 \times 10^{-3}}{2000} (3.9 \times 10^{-3})$$

(ii) If D valves are opened then system is effectively as shown:



Failure modes:	2 channels (1 way)
	l channel, l valve (2 ways)
	3 valves (2 ways)
	+ higher order modes

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$$Q_{S} \stackrel{i}{=} \text{ prob. of failing 2 channels + prob. of failing 1 channel and 1 valve}$$
$$\stackrel{i}{=} Q_{C}^{2} + 2 Q_{C}Q_{V}$$
$$= (8.5 \times 10^{-4})^{2} + 2(8.5 \times 10^{-4})(1.1 \times 10^{-3})$$
$$= \underline{3 \times 10^{-6}}$$

$$\frac{121.00-6}{121.00-6} \quad \frac{\text{The Binominal Distribution and Power System Reliability}}{1. \quad Q_{\text{S}} = \frac{14^{\text{C}}}{14^{\text{C}}} + \frac{14^{\text{C}}}{10^{\text{C}}} + \frac{14^{\text{C}}}{10^{C$$

Note system unavailability is greater than that in Example 5. Even though there are more valves in this system, the redundancy is decreased, because at least 12 of 14 valves are required for this system's success as compared with at least 6 of 8 valves in the system of Example 5.

	Out	tage O _k	Probability	Fraction of time O _k causes load loss	
k	Units Capacity		P _k	t _k (y/y)	Pktk
1	none	0	0.912	0	0
2	А	50	0.048	0.133	0.0064
3	В	60	0.038	0.400	0.0152
4	А,В	110	0.002	1	0.0020

2. (a) Capacity Outage Probability Distribution Table - Generators A, B

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Capacity Outage Probability Distribution Table

	Outa	age O _k	Probability	Fraction of time O causes load loss k	
k	Units	Capacity	P _k	t _k (y/y)	P _k t _k
1	none	0	0.87552	0	0
2	A	50	0.04608	0	0
3	В	60	0.03648	0.13333	0.00486
4	С	10	0.03648	0	0
5	A,B	110	0.00192	1	0.00192
6	A,C	60	0.00192	0.13333	0.00026
7	в,С	70	0.00152	0.40000	0.00061
8	A,B,C	120	0.00008	1	0.00008
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ELC =
$$\sum_{k=1}^{8} P_k t_k$$

ie, there is a load curtailment now only 0.77% of the time. Thus an increase of about 9% in generating capacity has reduced the ELC by a factor of about 3. This significant improvement occurs because the system can now tolerate a failure of generator A without load loss.

3. Forced Outage Rate = 0.015

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No OUT	Cap OUT	Probability	EXP% Load Curtailment
0	0	$0.985^3 = 0.95567$	0
1 1	0	$3 \times .985^2 \times .015 = 0.04366$	0
2	0	$3 \times .985 \times .015^2 = 6.649 \times 10^{-4}$	0
3	100%	$.015^3 = 3.38 \times 10^{-6}$	0.00338
			0.000338

(a) 3 x 100% transformer.

Expected hours curtailment = $3.38 \times 10^{-6} \times 8760 = 0.0296$ h

⁽b) 3 x 90% transformers.

No OUT	Cap OUT	Probability	Exp% Load Curtailment
0	0	0.95567	0
1 1	0	0.04366	0
2	10	6.649×10^{-4}	0.006649
3	100	3.38×10^{-6}	0.000338
J <u></u>	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		0.006987

Prob. (2 out) + Prob. (3 out) = 0.000668 Expected hour curtailment = 0.000668 x 8760 = 5.85 h

(c) 3 x 50% transformers.

NO OUT	Cap OUT	Probability	Exp% Load Curtailment
0	0	.95567	0
1	0	.04366	0
2	50	6.649×10^{-4}	0.033244
3	100	3.38×10^{-6}	0.000338
<u> </u>		La - Harding - La - L	0 033582

Prob. (2 out) + Prob (3 out) = 0.000668

. Expected hour curtailment = 5.85 h

NO OUT	Cap OUT	Probability	Exp% Load Curtailment
0	0	.985 ⁴	
1	0	$4 \times .98^3 \times .015$	
2	33-1/3	$6 \times .985^2 \times .015^2 = 1.3098 \times 10^{-3}$	0.04366
3	66-2/3	$4 \times .985 \times .015^3 = 1.3297 \times 10^{-5}$	0.000887
4	100	$.015^4$ = 5.0625 x 10 ⁻⁸	0.000005
<u> </u>			0.044552

(d) 4 x 33-1/3% transformers

Prob. (2 out) + Prob. (3 out) + Prob. (4 out) = 0.001323

. Exp hour curtailment = 0.001323 x 8760 = 11.6 h

Summary of Results

System	Exp% Load Curtailment	Exp Load Curtailment h/y
3 x 100%	0.000338	0.03
3 x 90%	0.00699	5.9
3 x 50%	0.034	5.9
3 x 33-1/3%	0.045	11.6





.*. 88.5% of the washers will be within specifications*From the Normal Distribution Table.



- t = battery lifetime in days
- $\mu = 1248$
- $\sigma = 185$
- 36 months = 1080 days

$$P(t \le 1080) = P(z \le \frac{1080 - 1248}{185})$$
$$= P(z \le -0.908)$$
$$= F(-0.908)$$
$$= 1 - F(0.908)$$
$$= 1 - 0.819$$
$$= 0.181$$

. . 18.1% of the batteries will have to be replaced.

121.10-2 App II

121.00-8 Basic Reliability Concepts

1. (a)
$$R_{S} = R_{A}R_{B}R_{C}$$

= $e^{-\alpha t}e^{-\beta t}e^{-\gamma t}$
= $e^{-(\alpha + \beta + \gamma)t}$

(b)
$$R_{S} = 1 - Q_{A}Q_{B}Q_{C}$$

= 1 - (1 - e^{- α t})(1 - e^{- β t})(1 - e^{- γ t})

(c)
$$R_{S} = R_{C}(R_{A} + R_{B} - R_{A}R_{B})$$

= $e^{-\gamma t}(e^{-\alpha t} + e^{-\beta t} - e^{-(\alpha + \beta)t})$
= $e^{-(\alpha + \beta + \gamma)t}(e^{\beta t} + e^{\alpha t} - 1)$

(d)
$$R_S = R_A R_B + R_C - R_A R_B R_C$$

= $e^{-(\alpha + \beta + \gamma)t} (e^{\gamma t} + e^{(\alpha + \beta)t} - 1)$

2.
$$R(50) = 0.9 \implies e^{-50\lambda} = 0.9$$

. $R(100) = e^{-100\lambda}$
 $= (e^{-50\lambda})^2$
 $= 0.81$

3. <u>4 Components in Parallel</u>: $R_{S} = {}_{4}C_{3}p^{3}q + {}_{4}C_{4}p^{4}$ $= 4(0.9)^{3}(0.1) + 1(0.9)^{4}$ = 0.9477

$$\frac{5 \text{ Components:}}{R_{S} = {}_{5}C_{3}p^{3}q^{2} + {}_{5}C_{4}p^{4}q + {}_{5}C_{5}p^{5}$$

$$= 10(0.9)^{3}(0.1)^{2} + 5(0.9)^{4}(0.1) + (0.9)^{5}$$

$$= \underline{0.99144} \quad (\text{Reliability improves since system can now tolerate 2 failures})$$

4.
$$R_{S1} = R_{S1}^B R_B + R_{S1}^{\overline{B}} Q_B$$

1

$$= (R_{A'} + R_{B'} - R_{A'}R_{B'})R_{B} + (R_{A}R_{A'} + R_{C}R_{B'} - R_{A}R_{A'}R_{C}R_{B'})Q_{B}$$

= (0.9 + 0.9 - 0.81)(0.9) + (0.81 + 0.81) - (0.9)⁴)(0.1)
= 0.98739

$$R_{S2} = 1 - Q_{S2}$$

= 1 - (Q_A Q_B Q_C + Q_B, Q_A, - Q_A Q_B Q_C Q_B, Q_A,
= 1 - (0.001 + 0.01 - 0.00001)
= 0.98901

System 2 has higher reliability because there are more possible paths, ie, A \longrightarrow B' and C \longrightarrow A', which are not open in system 1.



(c)
$$Q_{S3} = Q_{S3}^{1} r_{1} + Q_{S3}^{T} q_{1}$$
 (Baye's Theorem)
 $= q^{2}r + (q + q^{2} - q^{3})q$
 $= \underline{2 \times 10^{-4}}$

8.
$$Q_{SW} = P(SW \text{ fails} | \text{class 4 good}) R_4$$

+ $P(SW \text{ fails} | \text{class 4 failed}) Q_4$ (Baye)
= $(1 - R_{\text{pumps}} R_V) R_4 + (1 - R_G R_B R_P^2 R_V) Q_4$
 $\doteq (Q_{\text{pumps}} + Q_V) R_4 + (Q_G + Q_B + 2_{QP} + Q_V) Q_4$
Now $Q_{\text{pumps}} = P(3 \text{ or 4 of 4 pumps fail})$
 $= _4 C_3 Q_P^3 R_P + _4 C_4 Q_P^4$
 $= 4 Q_P^3$
 $\therefore Q_{SW} \doteq 4 Q_P^3 + Q_V + (Q_G + Q_B + 2Q_P) Q_4$
 $= 4 (6 \times 10^{-4})^3 + 7 \times 10^{-8}$
 $+ (7 \times 10^{-3} + 2 \times 10^{-2} + 2 \times 6 \times 10^{-4}) 8 \times 10^{-6}$
 $= \underline{3 \times 10^{-7}}$

9.

If S = system survives
IFO = switch 1 fails open
2FS = switch 2 fails short
IG = switch 1 is good, etc
then, by Baye's Theorem,

$$P(S) = P(S|1G)P(1G) + P(S|1FO)P(1FO) + P(S|1FS)P(1FS)$$

$$= [1 - P(2FO)]P(1G) + 0 + P(2G)P(1FS)$$

$$= (1 - \frac{\lambda_0}{\lambda}q)r + r(\frac{\lambda_S}{\lambda}q)$$

$$= r + qr(\frac{\lambda_S - \lambda_0}{\lambda})$$

$$= r(1 + \frac{\lambda_S - \lambda_0}{\lambda}) - r^2(\frac{\lambda_S - \lambda_0}{\lambda})$$

ie, $R_{S} = \frac{2\lambda_{S}}{\lambda}r + \frac{\lambda_{O} - \lambda_{S}}{\lambda}r^{2}$

The reliability of a single switch system is r.

$$\lambda_0 = \lambda_s \implies R_s = r$$

Thus when open and short failure modes are equally probable, adding a second switch has no effect on system reliability

$$\lambda_0 = 0 \implies R_s = 2r - r^2$$

Thus, when the switches can only fail short, system reliability is improved by adding the second switch. Note that the second switch is <u>physically</u> connected in <u>series</u>, but the reliability expression is appropriate for two components in parallel ie, the reliability block diagram would show the two switches in parallel.

$$\lambda_{\rm S} = 0 \implies R_{\rm S} = r^2$$

Thus, when the switches can only fail open, system reliability is reduced by adding the second switch.

10. (a)
$$R_{S} = R_{S}^{D}R_{D} + R_{S}^{\overline{D}}Q_{D}$$

$$= R_{D}(R_{S}^{DC}R_{C} + R_{S}^{D\overline{C}}Q_{C}) + Q_{D}(R_{S}^{\overline{D}C}R_{C} + R_{S}^{D\overline{C}}Q_{C})$$

$$= R_{D}R_{C}(R_{A}R_{B}R_{G} + R_{F} - R_{A}R_{B}R_{G}R_{F})$$

$$+ R_{D}Q_{C}(R_{A}(R_{B}R_{G} + R_{F} - R_{A}R_{B}R_{C}R_{E}R_{F})$$

$$+ Q_{D}Q_{C}R_{A}R_{B}R_{G}$$

$$= .81 (.729 + .9 - 0.6561) + .09 (.729 + .81 - .59049)$$

$$+ .09(.9(.81 + .9 - .729)) + .01 \times .729$$

$$= 0.788049 + .0853659 + 0.079461 + 0.00729$$

$$= 0.9601659$$
(b) $R_{S} = R_{S}^{A}R_{A} + R_{S}^{\overline{A}}Q_{A}$

$$= R_{A}(R_{S}^{A}R_{D} + R_{S}^{A\overline{D}}Q_{D}) + Q_{A}(R_{S}^{\overline{A}}R_{D} + R_{S}^{\overline{A}D}Q_{D})$$

$$= R_{A}R_{D}(R_{B}R_{G} + (R_{C} + R_{E} - R_{C}R_{E})R_{F} - R_{E}R_{G}(R_{C} + R_{E} - R_{C}R_{E})R_{F})$$

$$+ R_{D}Q_{A}(R_{C} + R_{E} - R_{C}R_{E})R_{F}$$

$$+ Q_{A}Q_{D}(0)$$

$$= 0.7932249 + 0.086751 + 0.08019$$

$$= 0.9601659$$



(b)
$$Q_{\rm S} = 0.00196327$$

12. (a) Let Q¹_{sys}, Q^{1fs}_{sys}, Q^{sys}_{sys} represents system unreliability given that diode 1 is up (good), failed short, failed open, respectively. Then by Baye's Theorem,

$$Q_{sys} = Q_{sys}^{1}R_{1} + Q_{sys}^{1fs}Q_{s} + Q_{sys}^{1fo}Q_{o}$$

= $Q_{s}R_{1} + 1Q_{s} + Q_{o}$
= (0.01)(0.97) + 0.01 + (0.03)(0.02)
= 0.0097 + 0.01 + .0006
= 0.0203

(b) UIR =
$$\frac{0.03}{0.0203}$$

= 1.48

(c)
$$Q_{s} = 0.02, Q_{o} = 0.01 \implies Q_{sys} = 0.02 \times 0.97 + 0.02 + 0.03 \times 0.01$$

= 0.0397
UIR = $\frac{0.0300}{0.0397}$
= 0.76

The parallel combination is less reliable than the single diode in this case because the second diode is more likely to fail the system by failing short than it is to save the system with diode 1 failed open.

121.00-9 Operation in the Wearout Region

1.



 $R(46000|45000) = R_{u}(46000|45000) R_{w}(46000|45000)$ where $R_{u}(46000|45000) = e^{-1000\lambda_{u}}$ = 0.9990and $R_{w}(4600|4500) = \frac{R_{w}(46000)}{R_{w}(45000)}$ $= \frac{1 - F(\frac{46000 - 50000}{5000})}{1 - F(\frac{45000 - 50000}{5000})}$ $= \frac{F(0.8)}{F(1)}$ $= \frac{0.7881}{0.8413} \text{ (from Normal Distribution Table)}$ = 0.9368. `. Mission Reliability = 0.9990 x 0.9368 = 0.9359

- 2. See text.
- 3. by replacing components preventatively before wearout
 by installing redundant components
 by increasing test frequency (passive systems only)

4. See text.

121.00-10 Some Modern Reliability Topics

1. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis

This is a suggested solution to the assignment question at the end of 121.00-10. It is not necessarily the only correct solution, and you may disagree with some of the conclusions. Your analysis should, however, have considered each of the failure modes detailed.

4

Line Number	Item	Failure Mode	MTTF	Effect of Failure	Severity	Comments
1	Suction Filter	Blocked	6 x 10 ² h	Greatly reduced oil supply.	3	Consider removal and replacement with tank strainer.
2	as l	Air leakage	2×10^5 h	Reduced O/P.	2	as 1.
3	Pump #1 or #2	Shut down	5 x 10 ³ h	Loss of backup.	1	Provide suction isolation valve for repair.
4	Electrical supply to pumps	Total loss	2×10^4 h	Total loss of Lub oil Pressure.	4	Consider DC supplied back-up or alternative AC supplies.
5	Discharge NR valve	Open	8 x 10 ⁸ h	None in normal operation except back pressure on standby pump.	2	Only a problem if one pump out for maintenance, or if standby had to be isolated to prevent rotation.
6	as 5	Shut	6 x 10 ⁸ h	Loss of standby pump a vai lability.	2	
7	Discharge Filter	Heavy Leakage	5×10^{5} h	Reduced oil supply. Heavy oil loss.	3	Fit two in parallel with ganged change- over valves.

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Line Number	Item	Failure Mode	MTTF	Effect of Failure	Severity	Comments
8	as 7	Blocked	2×10^3 h	Greatly reduced oil supply.	3	as 7
9	Pump pressure gauge #1 or #2	Loss of indication	9 x 10 ³ h		1	Are 2 required?
10	as 9	Burst	8 x 10 ⁴ h	Loss of pressure heavy loss of oil.	4	 (a) move to pump side of NR valve (b) fit isolation valve on root line (c) use orifice on root line to reduce leak rate until isolated OR use l gauge on suction of filter with isolation valve and orifice
11	Pressure gauge - filter dis- charge	Loss of indication	9×10^{3} h	No indication of pressure to bearings. No indication of filter ΔP	1	Fit transducer and alarm Fit 'pop up' ∆P alarm on filter
12	as ll	Burst	8×10^4 h	Loss of pressure heavy oil loss.	4	 use orifice to reduce leak rate Consider replacement unit (a) more reliable gauge, or (b) transducer and remote gauge

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FMECA GRID

Design Changes

As a result of this analysis, the following design changes could be considered.

- 1. Remove the suction filter and replace by a coarse strainer in the tank.
- 2. Provide isolation valves on pump suctions.
- 3. Provide DC supplied back up pump.
- 4. Fit two discharge filters in parallel, with ganged change over valves and high differential pressure "pop-up" alarms.
- 5. Move the pumps discharge pressure gauges to the pump side of the NR valve. Fit isolation valves on the root line. Fit orifices into the root line to reduce leak rate until isolation, or fit one gauge at filter inlet with an isolation valve.
- Fit pressure transducer and remote gauge, or alarm, at filter outlet.

L. Haacke R. Malcolm

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